Recent research has led to many important advances in our understanding of the nature of hospital competition. First, new methods for measuring markets have been developed that avoid ad hoc market definitions. Second, new measures have been developed that are closely tied to economic theory and take into account both geographic and product differentiation. Finally, a consensus has begun to emerge that the appropriate market to measure the effect of competition is narrow and that some mergers, even in heavily urbanized cities, have the potential to lead to significant price increases.
This research has the potential to be used by state and federal policymakers to improve policy decisions that could affect hospital competition. Indeed, federal hospital antitrust policy and state policy on certificate of need (CON) use already have been influenced by this research. Evolving policy on a wide range of important issues ranging from construction of specialty hospitals to rethinking nonprofit hospital tax exemptions relies on the rigorous peer-reviewed research that can be conducted because public-use data are available to investigators. This paper is neither meant to be a comprehensive review nor a synthesis of the literature. Such information is available elsewhere (see Dranove and White 1994; Dranove and Satterthwaite 2000; Gaynor and Vogt 2000; Gaynor and Haas-Wilson 1999; Morrissey 2001; Vogt and Town 2006) . Rather, I select papers from the health economics literature as examples of how data have been used to improve our understanding of the role of competition in health care, and hospital markets specifically. I focus on the use of patient discharge data, such as the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project State Inpatient Databases (HCUP-SID) and the Medicare Standard Analytic Files. Such data allow patients' preferences to be incorporated into models of hospital behavior through explicit models of hospital choice. Hospital choice models have been used to construct measures of competition, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), that overcome some of the biases associated with using aggregate data to construct the indices (Kessler and McClellan 2000; Gowrisankaran and Town 2003) . Also, alternative methods underpinned by hospital choice models have been created and implemented to measure the effect of competition on prices (Town and Vistnes 2001; Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite 2003; Gaynor and Vogt 2003) . Still others have used hospital choice models to make inferences regarding the profitability of services using changes in market structure (Chernew, Gowrisankaran, and Fendrick 2002) and the effect of hospital closure on social welfare (Capps, Dranove, and Lindrooth 2007) .
In addition, patient discharge data enable researchers to incorporate patient-level risk adjustment when analyzing quality, patient safety, and efficiency. Nevertheless, even more detail on clinical procedures and patients' disposition would afford researchers the opportunity to answer a broader set of questions that would be of interest to policymakers, clinicians, and health care administrators.
Defining the Hospital Market and Modeling Competition
As Luft and colleagues (1986) have pointed out, ''no hospital operates in a vacuum.'' The decisions and behavior of one hospital will affect the decisions and behavior of its competitors and the patients it serves. As in most industries, hospitals engage in both price and nonprice competition. Most economists would agree that a competitive market will yield lower prices than a more concentrated, less competitive market, ceteris paribus.
Hospital Service Offerings
As Gaynor and Vogt (2000) stress, the underlying force behind hospital competition is patient preferences (and by implication physician preferences). Heterogeneity in pa-tient preferences leads hospitals to differentiate along both clinical and nonclinical dimensions. This product differentiation leads to market power (Satterthwaite 1979 (Satterthwaite , 1985 ; thus there is a strong incentive to satisfy heterogeneous consumer preferences. This is a fundamental aspect of competition: hospitals will constantly evolve and adapt to provide attributes demanded by patients and their physicians (Gaynor and Vogt 2000) . It follows that patient choices contain information about the outcomes of competition. If preferences are reasonably exogenous, analysts can perform counterfactual simulations to analyze the effect of mergers, closures, entries, and changes in service offerings to inform antitrust and CON policies.
One way for a hospital to differentiate its product from that of competitors is through service offerings. Broadly defined, a service may or may not be related to clinical care. In the United States, before private and public health insurance became common in the 1960s, patients recuperated in wards-large rooms with rows of beds. While wards are still common in many countries, they are now relatively rare in the United States. Currently, hospitals usually offer private and semiprivate rooms with televisions and private phones. Many hospitals offer features such as four-star hotel-like lobbies and waiting rooms. These amenities are a result of hospitals responding to patient preferences that value nonclinical attributes.
Clinically related service offerings are another way for a hospital to differentiate itself from competitors. Offering a neonatal intensive care unit may give a hospital a competitive advantage over another hospital in the same market for labor and delivery admissions. A pregnant woman may strictly prefer to deliver her baby at a hospital with an on-site neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), while another may value hotel-like surroundings more highly than an on-site NICU and thus choose a hospital offering hotel-like facilities for a birth expected to be uncomplicated.
In research to date, the hospital market typically has been defined using a set of general hospital services and a geographic area. However, within the broad set of general hospital services are some fairly specialized services. Consider a large hospital in an urban core that has specialty units offering lithotripsy, open-heart surgery, and oncology. Patients who need these specialized services might bypass the local hospital and travel to this hospital. This highlights one of the drawbacks of defining a hospital market spatially using only general hospital services: if product differentiation is ignored, then one assumes that the bypassed hospital and the high-tech hospital are in the same market, and thus will overestimate the number of hospitals in the market for specialized services. At the same time, if the market is delineated based on current specialized service offerings, one will ignore the fact that the bypassed hospital has the potential to offer the service in the future.
Location
Another important aspect of differentiation is location. Distance to a hospital consistently has been shown to be an excellent predictor of where a patient is admitted. Using data from the period -1995 , Tay (2003 showed that about 64% of Medicare patients were admitted to the hospital closest to their homes. Furthermore, about 80% were admitted to hospitals within 10 miles of their houses. White and Morrisey (1998) , however, showed that travel patterns differ for Medicare and private patients, and also depend upon whether the patient lives in an urban or rural area.
In practice, the definition of the market often determines a hospital's ability to differentiate itself in terms of location. A market defines the set of hospitals that interact with one another, and these interactions will influence price and quality. The best market definition will identify only potential substitutes in both the geographic location and product dimensions. Garnick et al. (1987) compared alternative market definitions based on geopolitical boundaries, radius measures, and patient-origin data. They concluded that there is not one universally preferred definition, and care must be taken to choose the definition most appropriate for a given study. Geopolitical boundaries, such as counties or metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), often are used to define the market, but such definitions are based merely on convenience. Many states use very broad health care catchment areas when making judgments on certificate of need applications. Some researchers instead have used circular distances around a hospital to define its market and competitors. As is the case with definitions based on an MSA, this method has the advantage of being easy to compute and apply to a national data set. Robinson and Luft (1985) used a 15-mile radius; others have used a 30-kilometer (18-mile) radius (Chernew, Gowrisankaran, and Fendrick 2002) . Lindrooth, Lo Sasso, and Bazzoli (2003) compared the effect of closure on hospitals within 10 miles to those beyond 20 miles. While computationally convenient, such distance measures are somewhat arbitrary and may not be robust to small changes in the radius.
Traditionally, markets for the purpose of antitrust policy have been defined using an Elzinga-Hogarty analysis, which relies on patient flows (Elzinga and Hogarty 1978) . The market definition is based on the flows of patients into and out of a market. The market is expanded until there are few patients who leave the market area for care and few patients who enter the market area for care. The cut-offs applied tend to be from 75% to 90% (Gaynor and Vogt 2000) . For example, if 80% of the patients treated in the area were from inside the area, then there would be few patient ''exports.'' If at the same time, 80% of the patients residing in the area stayed in the area for treatment, then the market would be well-defined. This type of market definition may overstate or understate the true market area (see Gaynor and Vogt 2000 , Kessler and McClellan 1999 , or Capps et al. 2002 for detailed critiques of this method).
Finally, as part of the Dartmouth Health Atlas project, market definitions have been derived based on Medicare patient flows called ''health service areas'' (HSAs) and ''health care referral regions'' (HRRs) (Center for Evaluative Clinical Sciences 1996). HSAs are meant to capture markets for primary services, whereas HRRs are intended to capture markets for specialized services that require more travel. Recently, the HRR definition has been used by researchers to study the market for cardiac services (Nallamothu et al. 2007; Barro, Huckman, and Kessler 2006; and Chandra and Staiger 2007) .
Measuring Competition
In earlier research it was common to calculate a Herfindahl-Hirschman index to indicate the relative competitiveness of the market once the geographic boundary of a hospital market was defined. 1 The HHI may be the same for all hospitals in a market or can be specific to each hospital. If political boundaries or the Elzinga-Hogarty criteria are used, then the market shares are based on all hospitals within an area. This leads to one HHI for the entire market. If patient flows or variable radius methods are used, then the HHI is specific to the hospital. Keeler, Melnick, and Zwanziger (1999) and Kessler and McClellan (2000) offer recent, distinct examples of how patient flow HHIs can be used in practice. In principal, an HHI can be calculated for any service. Kessler and McClellan looked at cardiac services and patients with acute myocardial infarctions in particular. Keeler and colleagues focused on all general hospital services.
One problem with an HHI is that it is likely to be correlated with unobserved case mix or quality. For example, markets that are delineated by patient flows will be larger if severely ill patients travel further for highquality care. This will result in a relatively broad definition of the market and, in turn, a relatively small HHI. However, the costs and quality at the hospital that admits the complicated patients will be higher, and this may lead to an erroneous conclusion that more competition is correlated with higher costs and quality (see Dranove and White 1994 for an excellent example). I later describe methods that correct for this potential bias.
There also may be biases due to reverse causality. On the one hand, the admissions or beds used to create an HHI are a result of hospital attributes and the competitive environment. On the other hand, prices and costs may drive the number of admissions or beds. Thus changes in concentration may result from one hospital being low cost or low price and thereby attracting an increased share of patients. If efficient hospitals grow more quickly than inefficient hospitals, then heterogeneity in efficiency may be a determinant of changes in concentration (Frech and Mobley 2000) . In this scenario, a regression of a change in costs on a change in concentration would be incorrectly specified. One might conclude that increased concentration leads to lower costs rather than an alternative explanation that efficient firms grow faster, leading to both lower costs and a higher HHI.
Despite these potential flaws, the sign of the relationship between the HHI and hospital expenses recently has been shown to be robust to market definition and estimation method. Wong, Zhan, and Mutter (2005) calculated HHIs using the county, MSA, health service area, fixed radius, and variable radius measures. They showed that the estimated effect of competition on hospital expenses did not depend on the method chosen to measure the market. They also employed several different econometric approaches, including a correction for the endogeneity of the HHI using instrumental variables. The choice of method did not influence the conclusions about the effect of competition on costs but it did lead to changes in the magnitude of the effect.
Recent Research on Hospital Competition
Several papers written since the late 1990s avoid market definition by using patient-level data to first estimate a conditional logit specification of hospital choice. Predicted market shares then can be calculated using the estimated coefficients from the conditional logit model and used to create a measure of the degree of competition. Kessler and McClellan (2000) looked at the effect of competition on the quality of acute myocardial infarction (AMI) care for Medicare patients. They controlled for the endogeneity of the HHI by first estimating a patient choice model and used the coefficients to calculate a predicted HHI for each zip code. These then were aggregated to the hospital level using as a weight the predicted share of the hospital's patients from each zip code. Finally, they reallocated the hospital-level HHI back to the zip code level using as a weight the share of the zip code's patients at each hospital. They also calculated zip code level bed capacity per expected patient and the zip code density of hospital characteristics using each hospital's share of the zip code's patients as a weight. The estimates were identified primarily on variation in the geographic distribution of patients and hospitals. The patient-level regressions revealed that after 1990 less competition for Medicare patients was associated with higher mortality for Medicare patients.
A similar approach to measuring competition was taken by Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) , who looked at the mortality of pneumonia and AMI patients across multiple payers. Gowrisankaran Kessler and Geppert (2005) extended the Kessler and McClellan paper by looking at the effect of competition on health outcomes of more versus less severely ill patients. They found that outcomes of less severely ill patients were unaffected by competition but more competition led to better outcomes (and higher costs) for more severely ill patients. Tay (2003) estimated a multinomial choice model using both conditional logit and a mixed logit specification. The latter avoided the independence of irrelevant alternatives of the conditional logit specification. She found that patients considered geographic location when choosing a hospital and that taking into account quality and product differentiation was important in studies of competition.
Geographic boundaries continue to be used to define markets. Sari (2002) used a countylevel HHI and Ho and Hamilton (2000) used a HSA-level HHI. Ho and Hamilton found that mergers and consolidations may have increased 90-day readmission rates and early discharges of newborns (for Medi-Cal), but did not significantly affect inpatient mortality. The results for early discharge of newborns were found to be concentrated in less competitive markets and among system hospitals. Sari (2002) focused on the HCUP Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQI) (AHRQ 2004) and found that less competition (defined as an above-median HHI) led to more complications.
Several recent studies have taken advantage of natural experiments to examine how hospitals compete. Meltzer, Chung, and Basu (2003) found that competition after Medicare's shift to prospective payment reduced costs for the most severely ill patients. Shen (2003) found deleterious short-term effects of financial pressure related to prospective payment but no effect after one year. Dafny (2005) used a change in Medicare diagnosisrelated group (DRG) reimbursement to test how hospitals respond to price changes. She found that for-profit hospitals, in particular, responded to an increase in price by upcoding diagnoses to a more intensive DRG. However, volume, quality, and treatment intensity were not affected by a change in price. Lindrooth and colleagues (2007) used the HCUP-SID data to examine the effect of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA); they found that the treatment intensity of the most severely ill patients with generously reimbursed diagnoses declined more dramatically after the BBA at nonprofit hospitals. This result was likely due to higher discretionary quality at nonprofit hospitals.
Other studies have examined differences across payers. Volpp and colleagues (2003) measured the effect of price competition on quality for AMI patients in the context of a statewide shift to price competition from administered prices. They found that quality suffered for uninsured patients, but they did not find significant effects for the insured population. They noted that a contemporaneous reduction in subsidies for charity care may explain this differential effect. Bazzoli and colleagues (2006) found that safety-net hospitals reduced the amount of uncompensated care in response to financial pressure caused by the BBA. Using a sample from Florida's HCUP-SID data, Encinosa and Bernard (2005) found that BBA-related financial pressure was associated with worse performance on patient safety measures. Clement and colleagues (2007) used the HCUP-SID data from multiple states and found that the trend in patient safety was worse for Medicare and private patients; they concluded that this trend was likely related to reduced payments for these patients. Other studies have used the HCUP-SID data to examine the role of nurses in health care quality and patient safety (Mark et al. 2004 ). Chernew, Gowrisankaran, and Fendrick (2002) used entry behavior into bypass surgery to infer the returns by payer. They applied a structural model to estimate the total returns to entry in which they predicted volume using patient-level data. They found that fee-for-service (FFS) insurers provided a relatively high return for treating their patients; Medicare provided a high return early in the 1980s but lowered returns by the end of the decade. HMOs paid approximately average variable costs, and Medicaid reimbursed at a rate less than average variable costs.
New Measures of Competition-Taking Advantage of Bargaining Power
Town and Vistnes (2001) measured the effect of hypothetical mergers on hospital prices offered to HMOs within a bargaining framework. The paper was based on a structural model of bargaining with insurers combined with a patient's choice of hospitals. First, they estimated a conditional logit model of hospital choice and used the coefficients to simulate the substitutability of a hospital within a given network. The resulting measure of substitutability reflects both geo-graphic differentiation and product differentiation. Hospitals with many substitutes have less bargaining power with insurers than hospitals that are highly differentiated. Town and Vistnes regressed HMO prices on the measure of substitutability and found it to be an excellent predictor of negotiated prices. They also simulated potential price increases related to a hypothetical merger and found that that such a merger would lead to a greater than 5% price increase. They concluded that markets defined using a MSA or the Elzinga-Hogarty criteria would lead to underestimating a potential price increase because such markets were unjustifiably large. Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) refined the Town and Vistnes analysis and reframed it using a more generalizable approach. First, they derived a measure of the amount consumers are willing to pay, ex ante, to retain access to the hospital. The measure reflects the difference in the value of a hospital network with and without access to a given hospital. They tied the measure directly to theory making it easier to interpret than the Town and Vistnes measure. But like Town and Vistnes, their measure was based on estimates from a conditional logit model of hospital choice. The parameter estimates were used to calculate consumers' ex ante willingness to pay for access to a hospital. They then regressed the measure separately on a hospital's profits from private insurance and managed care plans using a specification that is loosely linked to a simple bargaining model. However, it required a simplifying assumption that there were no cost differences among the hospitals. Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite were very careful to report and justify the assumptions of the model and were transparent in how the results were identified.
Like Town and Vistnes (2001) , Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) concluded that even in highly populated urban areas a merger between two hospitals can lead to substantial price increases, often greater than 10%. They also stressed that the Elzinga-Hogarty criteria will lead to incorrect conclusions in the evaluation of prospective mergers (Capps et al. 2002) . The more generalizable approach of Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) has a large number of potential applications. For example, Capps, Dranove, and Lindrooth (2007) applied it to estimate the effect of hospital closures on social welfare. The technical advance of this paper was to use compensating differentials to translate the willingnessto-pay estimate into hours of drive time. The value of an hour of drive time was taken from the transportation economics literature to translate the measure into dollars. Gaynor and Vogt (2003) jointly estimated a structural model of demand and pricing based on a theoretical model. Like Town and Vistnes (2001) and Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) , they explicitly took into account both geographic and product differentiation. The demand for hospital services was modeled using a conditional logit model of hospital choice. The important difference in the Gaynor and Vogt approach is that they structurally estimated the price elasticity of demand and used the estimate to simulate the effect of mergers. In contrast, the Town and Vistnes (2001) and Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) approaches focused on estimating the marginal value of adding a hospital to an insurer's network. Gaynor and Vogt's estimates were identified using distance and the interactions of distance and exogenous characteristics of hospitals and patients. In other words, the geographic distribution of hospitals and patients was a source of identification. Gaynor and Vogt simulated equilibrium prices under merger scenarios and predicted price increases as high as 53% in San Luis Obispo County, California.
Other studies have looked at actual prices following a merger. Vita and Sacher (2001) found that a merger consummated in Santa Cruz County, California, led to price increases that were too large to be explained plausibly by an increase in unobserved quality. Krishnan (2001) followed Dranove and Ludwick (1999) , Keeler, Melnick, and Zwanziger (1999) , and Lynk (1995) and calculated the net price, or gross charges less discounts, at the DRG level and analyzed mergers in California and Ohio that were consummated in the year 1994-1995. They all found significant price effects that were robust to changes in the specification and sample.
Further applications in these promising lines of research are limited by the available data. Clearly, actual, contracted private prices are impossible to collect on a large scale; nevertheless credible measures of price can be derived from the discharge data when combined with discounts that are often available in hospital financial data. I describe this in more detail in the next section.
Data Needs for Improved Policy Studies
Earlier I provided examples of studies that have used patient-level discharge data to answer important questions about the hospital market. However, much more could be learned if other data were available. Studies focused on quality and patient safety, in particular, would benefit from more information about a patient's illness, services rendered during an admission, and the ability to track patients over time. For example, many measures of quality and patient safety require a follow-up window of up to 360 days. These measures tend to focus on whether the patient was readmitted after a procedure or received a required follow-up procedure upon discharge. Such measures are only possible if patients can be tracked over time. In addition, better risk adjustment can be done by looking at a patient's prior utilization. This type of information is found in the Medicare Standard Analytic Files, which is why so many studies focus solely on the Medicare population. Expanding this to the entire population could spark a whole new wave of research that might help explain hospital quality differences among private, Medicaid, and self-pay patients.
Physician identifiers, both of the admitting physician and the physician performing a patient's surgery, would be helpful to advance research on the physician's role in hospital quality. Currently, the hospital choice models described earlier ignore complicated physician-patient interactions. Thus, an implicit assumption is that the patient chooses a physician/hospital combination based solely on observable hospital characteristics. The results could be improved if more were known about the patient's primary physician or the surgeon conducting a surgical proce- Hospital unit-level staffing data also would greatly benefit research and make the results more useful for policymakers and hospital administrators. In particular, the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) registered nurses (RNs), FTE licensed practical nurses (LPNs), and other types of FTE patient-care staff in each hospital unit would allow researchers to create finer measures of nursing intensity. Currently these staffing variables are collected by the American Hospital Association (AHA) at the hospital level, but much more precise estimates of the value of nurses to an organization would be possible with unit-level data. At this time, such data are available only for hospitals in California. Given the difficulty in recruiting nurses, hospital administrators would benefit from research that provides generalizable guidance as to the optimal level of staffing by type of hospital unit.
Several states (California, Florida, New Jersey, and Washington) make detailed hospital financial data available to researchers. One reason so many earlier hospital studies focused on California hospitals is that such data were available. Variables of particular use are net patient revenue by payer type and cost-center specific costs. Other useful variables include uncompensated care expenses and discounts granted to each type of insurer. The Medicare cost reports include some of these measures, but unfortunately do not break out net patient revenue by payer. With information on the discounts granted to private insurers, researchers could derive a measure of price as implemented in Keeler, Melnick, and Zwanziger (1999) . Such measures, if available in more states, would enable researchers to examine a larger set of hospitals and markets, allowing for much richer and more generalizable studies of price competition.
Measures to Facilitate Research
In addition to the measures described previously, there are others that would be useful to researchers in this area that could be collected and disseminated by AHRQ. A particularly useful variable that has been used in the estimation of hospital choice models is the distance, or drive time, from a patient's zip code to each hospital in the choice set. This information is relatively time consuming to collect and is not currently available to researchers. This variable is also at the heart of the methods noted earlier to both calculate predicted HHIs and estimate structural models of the effect of competition on prices. The variable could be included, and shared with researchers, in a file that could be merged with either the HCUP-SID or the Medicare Standard Analytic Files.
It also would be particularly helpful to have validated hospital ownership data. The American Hospital Association includes a system ID variable in the Annual Survey of Hospitals, but there are some discrepancies in the timing of changes in system membership. A validated system ownership variable would facilitate research that analyzes local systems as distinct units as well as research that examines the effect of system acquisitions of hospitals.
Two other desirable measures that would save researchers a significant amount of time and avoid costly duplication of effort would be public provision of the zip code level HHIs of Kessler and McClellan (2000) and the hospital-level HHIs of Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) . As discussed earlier, these HHIs are plausibly exogenous in many circumstances, but they are computationally intensive to calculate. By including them in a file that is linkable to the HCUP-SID or the AHA data, AHRQ could spur significant research in this area. Finally, the Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) measure of the value a hospital brings to a network also could be calculated for all HCUP-SID hospitals in states that report patient zip codes. This measure would be useful to researchers in a variety of applications, including studies of entry, closure, charity care, location, and efficiency-all of which could lead to better hospital policy and improved hospital efficiency.
Conclusions
The notion that market competition will yield efficiency is central to many current public policies regarding the U. S. health system. The efficiency benefits of competition are especially important for hospital care since decisions about whether to offer new services, adopt new technologies, and provide emergency access are made by hospital administrators. Regulation, for the most part, should be designed to foster competition among hospitals and ensure access. As in the past, research on competition will lead to better informed policies that will improve both the quality and efficiency of health care.
Research since 2000 has led to a number of advances in the analysis of competition in hospital markets. The combination of widely available patient-level data and new models has spurred on this research. In the area of price competition, in particular, these models are likely to make an impact on policy and on the way hospital consolidation is regulated. The most important advance in our understanding of hospital competition is that prospective price increases are a result of changes in competition at both the geographic and product level. This has led to more accurate simulations of the effect of prospective mergers on prices. The results point to potentially large price increases for a few (but not all) mergers in even large urban markets. Previously, such predictions were based predominantly on markets defined solely by geography, making highly differentiated markets seem competitive when in fact they are not if product differentiation is taken into account. Thus a consensus has begun to emerge that the appropriate market for measuring the effect of competition on prices is relatively small, and that some mergers, even in heavily urbanized cities, have the potential to lead to significant price gains.
Most of the empirical research on the effect of competition on quality has occurred since 2000. In contrast to price competition, there is not yet a consensus on quality competition. Making more measures and more detailed data available to researchers will facilitate new studies in this area. They also will help us to better understand why the results related to quality vary across studies, and hopefully will allow us to reach a consensus on the effect of competition on hospital quality. Such research will bring us closer to the objective of fostering hospital markets that ensure the best possible patient outcomes at a sustainable price.
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